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the summons." It is submitted that this Court has accepted and expanded
this holding. Under Powell, a proceeding to enforce the Commissioner's sum-
mons must be instituted pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by
filing a complaint followed by answer and hearing." At this time, if the tax-
payer raises a substantial question that an enforcement of the summons would
be an abusive use of the court's process, then according to the Court's hold-
ing, the government will have to make a showing of probable cause." The
taxpayer can meet the burden by showing that the summons had been issued
to "harass the taxpayer or to put pressure on him to settle a collateral dis-
pute, or for any other purpose reflecting on the good faith of the particular
investigation."53
ROBERT J. DESIDERIO
Antitrust—Sherman Act—Inducing State Officer To Enforce a Law—
Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank.'—Appellant, trustee of the Coffeyville Loan
and Investment Co., brought an action under Section 4 of the Clayton Act,2
alleging violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 3 Appellant
averred that the defendants had conspired, together with the Attorney
General of Arizona, fraudulently to place the Arizona Savings and Loan
Association in receivership under Arizona law, 4 as part of a scheme to restrain
and monopolize financial transactions in the area. The state receiver refused
to honor the appellant's contracts with Arizona Savings, thus limiting its
refinancing resources. The district court held that appellant failed to state
a cause of action upon which relief could be granted and dismissed the
action. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit HELD: Merely inducing a state officer
to enforce a law, regardless of the substantive merits of the enforcement,
is not prohibited by the antitrust laws; allegations of this enforcement,
however, either as part of a larger anti-competitive scheme or one in which
the state officer was a conspirator are sufficient to state a cause of action.
Although the Sherman Act prohibits "every" agreement designed to
monopolize trade, the Supreme Court has held that it applies only to "un-
reasonable" restraints on trade. 3 In determining unreasonableness the Court
66 Id. at 445-46.
57 United States v. Powell, supra note 1, at 58 n.18.
58 Id. at 51: "We reverse, and hold that the Government need make no showing of
probable cause to suspect fraud unless the taxpayer raises a substantial question . . ."
(Emphasis added.)
59 Id. at 58.
1 339 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964).
2 "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue. . . ." 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
3 "Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
. . is declared to be illegal. . . . Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize . . . any part of [interstate or foreign] trade . . . shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor... ." 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1958).
4 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-422, 423 (1956), as amended, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann,
§1 6-480, 481 (Supp. 1964).
5 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910).
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has used two standards: the "rule of reason" 6 and the "per se" violation.?
Looking chiefly to the result of the activity to determine a violation, the
Court stated in American Tobacco Co. v. United States: 8 "It is not the form
of the combination or the particular means used but the result to be achieved
that the statute condemns.")
The Court has recognized, nonetheless, that certain actions, even if
resulting in a monopoly or restraint on trade, are not within the scope and
purpose of the antitrust laws, as, for example, restraints in industries
regulated by governmental agencies." Some forms of labor activity, such
as a strike or boycott, have also been held exempt from the antitrust pro-
hibitions." This exemption, however, may not preclude violation if the labor
activities are in conjunction with businessmen and produce a restraint of
trade. 12
 The case of Pennington v. United Mine Workers," alleging a union
conspiracy with large coal producers to monopolize trade in that industry,
offers a current example.
Another important area excluded from the purpose and scope of the
antitrust laws is state governmental action. In Parker v. Brown," the
Supreme Court stated "We find nothing in the language of the Sherman
Act . . . which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its
6
 The "rule of reason" was first enunciated in Standard Oil, supra note 5, and given
its classic definition by Mr. Justice Brandeis in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States,
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918):
To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar
to the business to which the restraint is applied ; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are
all relevant facts.
7 The "per se" doctrine was explained in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5 (1958):
tTlhere are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed
to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the
precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.
See Handler, Recent Developments in Antitrust Law: 1958-1959, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 843
(1959), and von Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine—An Emerging Philosophy of Antitrust
Law, 11 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 569 (1964).
328 U.S. 781 (1946). This case spelled out the implication of Georgia v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945), where Georgia was allowed to file an antitrust suit even
though the railroad rates were set up under the War Production Board. Subsequent deci-
sions in Slick Airways, Inc, v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1952) and
United States v. Association of American Railroads, 4 F.R.D. 510 (D. Neb. 1945) have
followed the Court's reasoning.
9 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, supra note 8, at 809.
19 For example, the Interstate Commerce Act provides that "any carriers . .
participating in a transaction approved or authorized • . . are relieved from the operation
of the antitrust laws... ." 24 Stat. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5(11) (1958). See
also, Shipping Act, 39 Stat. 733 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (Supp. V, 1964) ;
Civil Aeronautics Act, 72 Stat. 770, 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1958).
11 Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
12 Allen Bradley Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
18 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 377 U.S. 929 (1964).
14 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature."" In Parker,
state officers under the California Agricultural Producers Marketing Law,"
established and managed programs for marketing agricultural commodities
so as to restrain competition among the growers and maintain prices. Al-
though these activities were concededly monopolistic under the Sherman
Act if performed by individual agreement, the Court held that such activities
performed under a state legislative mandate were beyond the scope of the
Sherman Act, stating, "In a dual system of government . . an unexpressed
purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers . is not lightly to be
attributed to Congress."" 7
A question left unanswered by Parker was the liability of individuals
who conspired to induce state action for their own anti-competitive purpose.
This question arose in Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc.'s There, the plaintiffs alleged that the railroads, by inducing
enforcement of existing laws and pressing for new legislation against the
trucking industry, were conspiring to restrain trade in violation of the
Sherman Act. The Court held that such activities were chiefly political and
unaffected by the restrictions of the Sherman Act, despite any anti-com-
petitive purpose or effect they may have had.'° The "end result" test of
American Tobacco'-'P did not control because the activities were part of valid
governmental processes.
A question still remained, however, of the applicability of the Sherman
Act where there were allegations of participation by a state or its officers in
a private conspiracy to restrain trade. As the court in the instant case pointed
out, Parker explicitly reserved judgment on this point, stating, "we have no
question of the state .. . becoming a participant . . ." 21 The court in
the instant case also pointed out that Noerr did not preclude relief, since in
that case there were no allegations of participation by the state or its officers
in the conspiracy.
Viewing the question as one of first impression, the court in the instant
case held that a Sherman Act cause of action would exist where there was
alleged active participation in a conspiracy by a state or its officers. The
exemptions granted state action under Parker, as well as the protection
afforded individuals to petition for government action under Noerr, do not
extend to the situation where there is the added factor of active participation
by a state or its officers.
The court in the instant case also held that liability would be found if
the plaintiff could show that the enforcement of the law was but one element
in a larger plot to restrain trade. Although the court does not cite authority,
support for this position appears in Noerr where the Court pointed out that
not all activity under the guise of political action is to be protected, stating:
15 Id. at 350-51.
18
 Cal. Agri. Code, §§ 2000-2400 (1954).
17 Parker v. Brown, supra note 14, at 351.
18
 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
19
 Id. at 140.
20 American Tobacco Co, v, United States, supra note 8.
21
 Parker v. Brown, supra note 14, at 351.
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"There may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed
toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham . . . and the applica-
tion of the Sherman Act would be justified." 22
Another important aspect of the present case is that the court felt that
without the Attorney General's alleged participation the Noerr rule protecting
rights of citizens to petition their government would apply regardless of the
substantive merits of their petition. This would seem to conflict with the
Sixth Circuit which, in the Pennington case,23 held that only activities
conducted in good faith would be excluded from the ambit of the antitrust
laws. The allegation in Pennington was that the union and larger coal
producers had attempted to induce the Secretary of Labor to extend the
minimum wage provided in the Walsh-Healey Act.24 to all coal producers
dealing with governmental agencies, thus forcing the plaintiff to pay higher
wages and thereby driving him out of business. The court there revived an
intent criterion while the instant court held such activity exempted regard-
less of intent or result.
Not only did the instant court avoid any intent criterion but it also
felt that the legitimacy of the methods used to induce the enforcement of
the law does not affect their liability under the Sherman Act. Whether the
Supreme Court in Noerr meant to protect fraudulent acts which induced
state action, such as those alleged in the instant case, is questionable. In
Noerr, no one alleged that the enforcement of laws against the truckers was
attempted by fraud. The Court said: "[T [he Sherman Act does not apply
to those activities of the railroads at least insofar as those activities com-
prised mere solicitation of governmental action. . . . "25 (Emphasis added.)
The Court took care not to call the activities illegal in themselves but
viewed them as accepted political procedures.
One case which has held that Noerr does not protect fraudulent peti-
tions for government action is Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v.
Aluminum Co. of America. 2 €' There, the court held that a fraudulent attempt
to influence state action, by filing false statements of oil production, stated
a cause of action under the Sherman Act. The defendants claimed that
Noerr controlled but the court felt that the activities in Noerr were
"political," while the fraudulent acts in its case were not, and that to deny
them protection was not to deny any of the freedoms guaranteed by Noerr.
JAMES J. DEAN
22 Eastern R.R. Presidents v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., supra note 18, at 144.
23 Pennington v. United Mine Workers, supra note 13, at 817.
24 66 Stat. 308 (1936), 41 U.S.C. § 43A-45 (1958).
25 Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., supra note 18,
at 138.
26 36 F.R.D. 107 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
931
